TURKEY VISION 2053 - Printable Version

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RE: TURKEY VISION 2053 - globalvision2000administrator - 12-21-2022

From the eyes of journalists




While the Obama Administration and the CIA officially cling to the fig leaf lie that US intelligence was innocent of any involvement in the failed July 15 coup d’ etat attempt by the CIA-run Fethullah Gülen organization in Turkey, the truth is coming out from senior US intelligence insiders themselves. It reflects a huge internal faction struggle within US leading circles in what by all accounts is shaping to be the most bizarre Presidential election year in American history.

The first admission that US intelligence had their hand in the anti-Erdogan coup, a coup launched just days after Erdogan announced a major strategic shift away from NATO and towards Russia, came from Zbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinski is one of the most senior members of the US intelligence establishment, a former Obama Presidential adviser and former National Security Council architect of the Jimmy Carter 1979 Mujahideen Afghanistan terror operations against the Soviet forces in that country.

In a Twitter tweet from his own blog, Brzezinski wrote a precis of a new article he wrote for The American Interest magazine. He writes, “The US backing of the attempted coup against the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was a grave mistake that could deliver a major blow to the US reputation.” That’s definitely putting it mildly given what’s unfolding in Turkey since July 15.

Brzezinski went on to write, “Turkey was on the verge of reconsidering its foreign policy after failure in the Syria during the last five years, and the US miscalculation in supporting the coup and hosting its leader (Fethullah Gülen, now in CIA-arranged exile in Pennsylvania-w.e.) was so serious that it is no longer possible to put the blame on once-US-ally Turkey if it turns its back on US and rethink (sic) its policies.” He continues, “A potential Russia-Turkey-Iran coalition would create an opportunity to solve the Syrian crisis. If Erdogan had the smallest bit of wisdom, he should have come to the understanding that he could not make an independent credibility with the help of some ‘decayed’ Arab countries,” no doubt referring to Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the prime financiers of the Syrian terror war against Assad since 2011.

Brzezinski, who together with Henry Kissinger was one of the foremost US foreign policy strategists of the postwar period, the founding Executive Director of David Rockefeller’s Trilateral Commission, and one who still today presumably retains Top Secret clearance access to US intelligence reports, was expressing his fury at the utter incompetence of US intelligence in managing the Turkey relationship. Notably, the person in the US State Department directly responsible for not only the disastrous US coup in February, 2014 in Ukraine, but also for Turkey, is the hapless neo-con perpetual warrior-ess, Victoria “Fuck the EU” Nuland, wife of neo-con Robert Kagan.

Brzezinski’s candid critique was followed up by an even more detailed expose of US intelligence ties to Fethullah Gülen, charged by the Turkish government with treason and backing the July 15 coup. In a guest article in the EU online mgazine dated 17 August, 2016, Arthur H. Hughes confirms the intimate links between Gülen and the CIA, noting that “Gülen fled to the US with the assistance of the diplomat Morton Abramovitz, CIA agents Graham Fuller and George Fidas, and the above-mentioned Fr. Alexander Karloutsos.”

Gülen CIA friend Bartholomew I

Hughes’ article is a bombshell in many respects, and most definitely in his detailing of the intimate ties between the CIA, Gülen and the current Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople, current Archbishop of Constantinople and Ecumenical Patriarch. Hughes described the above-mentioned Father Alexander Karloutsos:

“…one of the members of the American-Israeli lobby in the Constantinople Patriarchate is Father Alexander Karloutsos, Public Affairs Officer close to Archbishop Demetrios (of America-w.e.). Thanks to his ties with high-level officials and Greek-American billionaires, he is basically the only person who controls the money flows from the US to the Phanar (the Greek Orthodox part of Istanbul-w.e.), and that gives him wide possibilities of exerting pressure upon the Ecumenical Patriarchate. On the other hand, Karloutsos is also in good relations with former CIA Director George Tenet, and with the preacher Fethullah Gülen cooperating with the American intelligence.”

George Tenet, a close ally of the Clinton political machine is a Greek-American former head of CIA during the time of Bill Clinton and also George W. Bush. The Clintons are both on record praising Fethullah Gülen. It seems to be a cozy network of CIA-Gülen-Constantinople Patriarchate-Clintons, all financed with “money from Greek-American billionaires.”

Arthur H. Hughes is not a casual commentator on events in Turkey and the Middle East. He was US Ambassador to Yemen in the 1990’s during the Clinton Presidency, then Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. He also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asia, and was Deputy Chief of Mission in Tel Aviv. His linking of Gülen to the CIA and to the Constantinople Patriarchate points to one of the least-public and most influential covert CIA-run networks in the world, the anti-Moscow Orthodox Patriarchate of Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople. Hughes suggests that if Erdogan and the Turkish government are serious about dealing with future coup threats, they should put the Constintanople Patriarchate under the magnifying glass.

As I’ve documented in my book, The Lost Hegemon: Whom the gods would destroy, Graham E. Fuller and George Fidas, both decades-long senior CIA officials managed to secure an extraordinary permanent residence in Saylorsburg, Pennsylvania, over the loud formal objections of the US State Department, in 1999, when Gülen was about to be charged by the Turkish authorities for inciting treason.

Most recently, Fuller felt compelled to write on his blog that, indeed he did help Gülen obtain a US green card, but that no, Gülen was not behind the failed July 15 coup. However Turkish reports place Fuller and another senior CIA ally, Henri J. Barkey, at a luxury hotel on one of the Princes’ Islands in the Sea of Marmara, some twenty minutes from Istanbul the night of the failed coup. In a subsequent appearance at a Washington think tank forum held by the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a neo-con address whose chairman is former CIA director, neo-con James Woolsey III, Barkey and his host tried to make a feeble joke about his presence in Istanbul the night of the coup and his ties to Gülen.

For once, Brzezinski is right.

The CIA-Gülen coup d’etat attempt to topple Erdogan after his turn towards rapprochement with Moscow was “a grave mistake.” The consequences, aside from a massive crackkdown on Gülen networks and media inside Turkey, include an open dialogue of Erdogan and the Turkish government of Prime Minister Binali Y?ld?r?m with Russia and now with Iran, about a “solution” to the Syrian war that would include Bashar al-Assad as at least a transition figure.

The Erdogan pivot East since the failed CIA coup has forced the Pentagon to quietly remove its nuclear warheads from Turkey’s Incirlik airbase near the Syrian border to Romania. At the same time, Turkey’s Prime Minister on August 20 stated to the media that Russia could possibly use Turkey’s Incirlik Airbase if necessary, something that certainly produced more acute gas pains in Langley, Foggy Bottom (the more than fitting name for the US State Department headquarters), and the Obama White House.

July 15 may go down in history as one of the most decisive defeats of American global power projection, of the so-called New World Order of David Rockefeller and friends. If so, not a minute too soon for the prospect of a more peaceful world.


A year on the UAE and Egypt's involvement in Turkey's failed coup attempt is more apparent than ever before. The Turkish government's attitude toward Iran and Libya was another reason behind the UAE's support for last year's failed coup attempt, writes Telci Umit. 

Ismail Numan Telci is the Deputy Director of the Middle East Institute (ORMER) at Sakarya University.

The July 15 coup attempt in Turkey sent shockwaves throughout the world, including Arab countries. Many Arabs, who have witnessed the reversal of the Arab Spring revolutions, staunchly opposed the coup attempt and showed support for the Turkish people and government. However, certain Arab governments and their operatives were openly supportive of the coup plotters and even offered logistical support to FETO, the armed organisation led by the US-based Turkish national Fethullah Gulen that orchestrated the failed coup.

Although the relationship between these Arab governments and Gulen supporters wasn't initially clear, it came to be better appreciated in light of new evidence that has been discovered over the past year.

Egypt's government emerged as the most vocal supporter of the July 15 coup attempt in Turkey. In the immediate aftermath of the failed coup, the government of General 
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi announced that it could consider granting asylum to Fetullah Gulen in case he was compelled to leave the United States. Meanwhile, Egyptian authorities failed to impose restrictions on FETO's activities within their borders and allowed the group's representatives to appear on Egyptian TV channels in order to defend the coup plotters. Moreover, pro-government broadcasters in the country adopted an editorial line that sided with the coup plotters against Turkey's democratically elected government. In an effort to spread the messages of Fetullah Gulen to the Arab world, a television network owned by Mohammed Dahlan, a Palestinian adviser to the UAE broadcast an interview with the failed coup's mastermind.

The UAE was another strong supporter of the coup attempt in Turkey. It has recently been revealed that, unsettled by Ankara's regional policy in recent years, the country took a series of thinly veiled steps to support FETO's attempt to remove Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan from power. 

In June, emails leaked from the personal account of Abu Dhabi's ambassador to Washington, Yousef al Otaiba, revealed that the Gulf nation could have played a greater role in last summer's failed coup than originally anticipated.

The emails showed that Otaiba was in close contact with senior officials from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), a US-based think-tank primarily financed by the pro-Israel businessman Sheldon Adelson. An exchange between the UAE ambassador and John Hannah, a senior counsellor at the foundation, provided valuable insights into Abu Dhabi's relationship with the coup plotters in Turkey.

In one of the leaked emails, Hannah, a former deputy national security adviser to former Vice President Dick Cheney, sent Otaiba an article claiming that both the UAE and FDD were responsible for the July 15 military coup attempt in Turkey, saying he is "honoured to be in the UAE's company".

Turkey's strong economic, military and political ties with Qatar are another reason behind the UAE's hostile attitude towards the Turkish government. Hannah previously published an article at titled "How Do You Solve a Problem Like Erdogan?" in which he suggested that the Turkish military would turn on Erdogan to "save" Turkey. Also, in an article published by Middle East Eye in July last year, British journalist David Hearst claimed that the UAE had set aside significant funds to ensure that the coup attempt in Turkey would be successful. He alleged that Mohammed Dahlan, acting on behalf of the UAE government, delivered money to FETO operatives. Last month, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu told the press that a Muslim country had spent $3bn on efforts to overthrow the Erdogan government, adding weight to the claims that the UAE funded last year's coup attempt.

UAE's motives

There are several reasons behind the UAE's desire to topple Turkey's government. 

First of all, it is no secret that the UAE has been unhappy with the Turkish government's approach to the Arab Spring revolutions. When protests broke out in several Middle Eastern countries, Ankara expressed solidarity with the pro-democracy forces and openly supported the replacement of Western-controlled authoritarian regimes with democratically elected governments. Believing this pro-democracy message to be detrimental to its own interests, Abu Dhabi took measures against the country.

Another important factor behind AUE's support for the Turkish coup plotters was Turkey's support for the Muslim Brotherhood, a moderate movement that enjoys vast popularity in Egypt and across the Muslim world.

Believing that the group poses a challenge to their rule, political elites in Abu Dhabi adopted a staunch anti-Brotherhood policy. In 2013, they supported Sisi's military coup which removed Brotherhood's Morsi from power in Egypt and later they took a series of steps to topple the government of Turkey in a similar manner. They also orchestrated - alongside Saudi Arabia - the on-going blockade of Qatar.
Turkish government's attitude toward Iran and Libya was another reason behind the UAE's support for last year's failed coup attempt.

WATCH: Qatar and Turkey 'see eye to eye' in many regional issues (3:57)

In Libya, the Turkish government is supporting the formation of a democratic government while the UAE is backing the military government of Khalifa Haftar and refusing to help the war-torn country move towards democracy. At the same time, Abu Dhabi remains unsettled by Ankara's friendly relations with Tehran at a time when it wishes to isolate the country. 

Turkey's strong economic, military and political ties with Qatar are another reason behind the UAE's hostile attitude towards the Turkish government. The strengthening cooperation between Ankara and Doha leaves several Gulf countries - including Saudi Arabia and the UAE - unsettled, because they do not want Turkey to become more influential in the Gulf region. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh's recent call for the immediate shutdown of the Turkish military base in Qatar is an example of this sentiment.

Finally, Turkey's search for a new regional order in the Middle East encourages the UAE to work more closely with regional and global players to isolate Ankara. The UAE has been engaging Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Israel, the United States and others in an effort to mitigate the Turkish influence in the Middle East.

Committed to the goal of promoting democracy, perpetuating peace and spreading development and economic welfare to all societies in the Middle East, Turkey will remain a transformative player in the region. Ironically, the support provided by certain local and global stakeholders to the coup plotters in Turkey not only boosted Turkish President Erdogan's popularity, but also led Ankara to reconsider its policy towards said countries. Promoting regional cooperation and urging local players to have more control over the Middle East, the Turkish government should be expected to work more closely with governments that share these goals and to take stronger action against those that disagree.

Ismail Numan Telci is the Deputy Director of the Middle East Institute and an assistant professor at the Department of International Relations at Sakarya University. He is also a foreign policy researcher for SETA.

RE: TURKEY VISION 2053 - globalvision2000administrator - 12-21-2022


Akinci : “If we want to get a result in Cyprus we need willpower, determination, reasonableness and realism more than time”

President Mustafa Akinci stated that willpower, determination, reasonableness and realism are of greater importance than the required time in order to achieve a result in Cyprus.

Speaking at the Global Leaders Forum organised by the Bahçehir University, President Akinci emphasized that the only way to overcome the problems in Cyprus will be to sit and work towards a solution and avoid unilateralism. President Akinci also added that he has made his views clear to the Greek Cypriot leader in this regard.

Noting  that last year he had hoped for 2016 to become the year of solution at the same forum at Bahçehir University, Akinci said, “The reasons behind this goal are very clear: 2017 has brought some significant risks in terms of the Cyprus talks. Presidential elections will be held in the Greek Cypriot side. Furthermore, the Greek Cypriot Parliament took a decision to commemorate Enosis at schools after 67 years and negotiations stopped for two months for this reason. We did our utmost with good intentions to reach a conclusion in 2016 as the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey. We also did our part on territory and map issues, but the Greek Cypriot side did not demonstrate the necessary courage and intention.”

Akinci continued, “If we want to get a result in Cyprus, we need willpower, determination, reasonableness and realism instead of more time. The reason why we have not achieved any firm outcomes, even now, is the stance of the Greek Cypriot side. Our rights have been repressed for 54 years. We have the right to an equal partnership in the administration of Cyprus. In the establishment of a new state, political equality is our sine qua non. My people, the Greek Cypriot administration and the UN are aware that I will not sign an agreement and present it to a referendum unless a solution has been reached based on political equality. Both sides’ effective participation in the decision-making process is very important.

Although some are claiming that there is no need for a timetable, 50 years have already passed and we have no intention of carrying on with the same discussions for another 50 years. In all likelihood, this is the last effort of my generation for a federal solution. I think the work of the UN needs to be accelerated. I do not offer arbitration but the UN can develop its bridging role between the sides”  President Akinci concluded.

Özgürgün: “As long as the Turkish Cypriot people exist on this land, the flag will remain on the mountains”

Stating that the flag on the Besparmak Mountains is a turning point and a product of great energy and effort, Prime Minister Hüseyin Özgürgün said last week that as long as the Turkish Cypriot people exist on this land, the flag will continue to remain on the mountain.

Prime Minister Hüseyin Özgürgün spoke while he received a delegation from the Society for the Illumination of the Flag at Besparmak Mountains headed by Tanju Müezzinoglu.

During the meeting, Özgürgün stated that the flag is a symbol of the presence of the Turkish Cypriot people on this land, and that it is an important project and action.

Atun holds contacts in the UK

Economy and Energy Minister Sunat Atun, who participated in the Festival of North Cyprus in London last week, organized under the slogan “We are carrying the TRNC to London”, held meetings with Emma Edhem, President of Turkish-British Chamber of Industry and Commerce (TBCCI), President of Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce UK (CTCC), Muhammet Yasarata and Global Vision 2000 General Manager Moeen Yaseen.

RE: TURKEY VISION 2053 - globalvision2000administrator - 12-21-2022


Economist Charles Robertson discusses the issues behind Turkey's currency turmoil.

At the end of a volatile week for the embattled Turkish lira, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has called on Turks to convert foreign currency savings into the country's currency. The lira, which has fallen about 15 percent this year, hit a low of 4.93 against the US dollar on Wednesday, before Turkey's central bank raised its top interest rate by three percentage points to 16.5 percent in an attempt to help stabilise the currency.

Erdogan has been struggling to stop the currency crisis ahead of the snap presidential and parliamentary elections on June 24.  On Wednesday, credit ratings agency Moody's cut Turkey's economic growth forecasts. Offering his take on Turkey's economy, Charles Robertson, chief global economist at Renaissance Capital, explains that the big swings in the currency are due to "a massive build-up of private sector debt in Turkey over the last 10-15 years." 

He says that in recent years there's been growing concern that "at some point in the medium term, like now, you're going to see a lending stop, growth stop, and then people flee Turkish assets because people have been buying into Turkey under the assumption it would grow five percent forever and the risk is it's going to slump into recession."

These are tough [economic] times for Turks now.
Charles Robertson, chief global economist, Renaissance Capital

While Turkey's private sector debt is around 70 percent of GDP , the "particular size of the borrowing is not the issue ... China is double that," he says. "It's the scale of the increase over 10 years, which usually coincides with excess borrowing, bad borrowing decisions - perhaps into real estate or something similar - and that tips over. We saw that a lot in the global financial crisis across Eastern Europe countries and to some extent the US had that problem in the global financial crisis."

Asked about Erdogan's recent comments describing high-interest rates as the "mother of all evil", Robertson says, "Erdogan was the market's darling for a decade or so. And there was always local concern that he was encroaching his powers getting too great. He's now been empowered for so long that there is very little constraint upon him ... But it's the central bank which has people concerned the most because Turkey relies on foreign capital to fund its current account deficit ... It needs foreign capital. So to say 'we don't want to pay the interest rates required to attract that capital has frightened the markets."

This week, the central bank finally announced a streamlining of interest rate tools to focus on having one single main rate to reassure investors.

"The 300 bases point rate hike has helped, having interest rates up at around 16 percent has helped, but also for a number of years the central bank has been trying to raise rates but not tell the electorate in Turkey that they're raising rates to try and keep the President [Erdogan] happy," says Robertson.  "This repo rate, which was sitting at around at eight percent, and has now been raised to 16.5 percent or so. That is a sign that finally orthodoxy seems to have won. And in the longer run that will work, like it worked for Russia."

"Orthodoxy does win in the end and it looks like Erdogan has given up ... The central bank is being allowed to do what orthodox people would suggest and what the market wanted to see."
But in the short term, Robertson believes that we will "see inflation rise and that's going to hurt poor people. It usually hurts the poorest."

He predicts that growth will be slow, "at best two to three percent this year. And the population is growing [at the rate of] one to two [percent], so per capita, that's really not much of a gain. These are tough times for Turks now."


Post-election Turkey provides a great opportunity for the country to move from an emerging economy, to a fully industrialised nation. Turkish politics is not for the faint at heart, they say. This seems to be especially true during election time. As Turkey is once again headed towards an election, presidential candidates are already making passionate statements and ambitious campaign pledges. 

Campaign manifestos reveal different trajectories for the country. But, there is one theme that all spectators seem to agree on; new elections may mark the beginning of a new economic paradigm for Turkey.

Over the last two decades, Turkey has experienced an impressive growth record. While Turkey's GDP per capita multiplied fivefold (a growth miracle by any standard), large segments of Turkish society have moved out of poverty. 
However, Turkey’s biggest challenge to become an industrialised nation still lies ahead. In order to accomplish high levels of per-capita income, Turkey needs to develop its productive capacity in industrial technologies and transform its economy from labour-intensive sectors to high-value-added manufacturing. The upcoming elections could be an economic turning point.

Economists have identified a number of trends in the development of emerging economies. With some exceptions, most emerging countries transform their economies from agriculture to labour-intensive manufacturing in the early phases of economic development. As people migrate from rural to urban areas, labour gets cheaper and labour-intensive sectors become attractive for investors. Countries that can successfully promote these industries, attract capital inflow, and find markets for their exports experience high growth in their take-off period of economic growth.

Turkey has been very successful in hitting these milestones in recent decades. One of the main tenants of the Justice and Development (AK) Party government, which first came to power in 2002, has been integration into world trade and financial markets. Consequently, while foreign direct investmentsreached unprecedented levels, exports soared.

Furthermore, government commitment to fiscal and monetary discipline, Turkey’s consistently high inflation rate had been reduced to unprecedented single digits (it has only recently increased to around 12 percent), and public debt has been substantially reduced. This has meant two decades of macro-economic stability and higher prosperity for every layer of Turkish society.

As early opportunities for economic growth via structural transformation and integration into the global economy have depleted, Turkey now needs to make its leap towards capital intensive production. Otherwise, it may become another victim of what is known as the middle-income trap. Economists now know that most developing countries, including Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia, struggle to pass beyond per capita income levels of 10-12 thousand dollars and join the group of high-income countries. The lesson here is that any successful long-term growth strategy has to define a way to make its transition to high-value-added industrial production.

The Turkish economy is still a mass importer of intermediate goods and high-tech products. Even the automotive industry, one of the lucrative sectors of Turkish manufacturing, imports more than it exports.  Turkey’s trade imbalance is compounded by Turkey's energy import dependency. Unlike some of its neighbours, Turkey has had bad luck with natural resources. The country imports almost 75 percent of its total energy use, which makes up around half of Turkey’s total trade deficit. And, note that Turkey’s energy usage has almost doubled within last two decades in line with its high economic growth.

Consequently, even though Turkey has accomplished important successes in multiplying its export volume and total output levels, it still has a current account deficit problem, which makes the economy vulnerable to short-term capital movements. This vulnerability manifested in the recent fluctuations of the exchange rate. This is another indication that Turkey needs to transform its economy, and do it quick.

I would argue that Turkey is ready to make its transition to become a developed country with an economy driven by high-tech engineering. The levels of capital accumulation realised over the last two decades, experience acquired by the private sector thanks to better integration with global markets, and improvements made in the sophistication of financial institutions give Turkey amply ground to move to more sophisticated production.

However, this requires greater effort, courage and political will from policy makers – which is why the elections may mark an important turning point. The constitutional changes, which the Turkish people voted for two years ago, provides a clear-cut division of labour between the parliament and the president, and decorates the president with executive power for a 5 year term in office.

This means that although the new president, unlike his predecessors, will not have the power to legislate, he will be able to single-handedly design and implement economic policy (after a budget is passed by parliament) over a considerable period of time. Last year, it was announced that government, in an attempt to increase market share of domestic high-tech products, will be supporting production of Turkey’s first domestically designed and manufactured automobile. Furthermore, Turkey’s R&D investments in defence industry have already started to pay-off. Today, domestic production accounts for 60 percent of the Turkish military's requirements and aims for 100 percent by 2020, compared to only 25 percent two decades ago. Turkey just recently signed a deal for the sale of Turkish-designed and produced attack helicopters to Pakistan.

Turkey have also started to make some aggressive investments in renewable energy resources. While solar energy production tripled within 2017, Turkey’s already produces 8 percent of its energy from wind power.

Turkey should genuinely endeavour to invest in high-tech sectors, improve its human capital through education, and become a hub for engineering in all sectors. Election manifestos show that there is more awareness and willingness from politicians than ever before. Long-term political stability, expected after the elections, is a great opportunity to take advantage and transform the economy. It is time for Turkey to move into the big league.


In the past few weeks, a conflict between Ankara and Baghdad over Turkey’s role in the liberation of Mosul has precipitated an alarming burst of Turkish irredentism. On two separate occasions, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan criticized the Treaty of Lausanne, which created the borders of modern Turkey, for leaving the country too small. He spoke of the country’s interest in the fate of Turkish minorities living beyond these borders, as well as its historic claims to the Iraqi city of Mosul, near which Turkey has a small military base. And, alongside news of Turkish jets bombing Kurdish forces in Syria and engaging in mock dogfights with Greek planes over the Aegean Sea, Turkey’s pro-government media have shown a newfound interest in a series of imprecise, even crudely drawn, maps of Turkey with new and improved borders.

Turkey won’t be annexing part of Iraq anytime soon, but this combination of irredentist cartography and rhetoric nonetheless offers some insight into Turkey’s current foreign and domestic policies and Ankara’s self-image. The maps, in particular, reveal the continued relevance of Turkish nationalism, a long-standing element of the country’s statecraft, now reinvigorated with some revised history and an added dose of religion. But if the past is any indication, the military interventions and confrontational rhetoric this nationalism inspires may worsen Turkey’s security and regional standing.

At first glance, the maps of Turkey appearing on Turkish TV recently resemble similar irredentist maps put out by proponents of greater Greecegreater Macedoniagreater Bulgariagreater Armeniagreater Azerbaijan, and greater Syria. That is to say, they aren’t maps of the Ottoman Empire, which was substantially larger, or the entire Muslim world or the Turkic world. They are maps of Turkey, just a little bigger.

But the specific history behind the borders they envision provides the first indication of what’s new and what isn’t about Erdogan’s brand of nationalism. These maps purport to show the borders laid out in Turkey’s National Pact, a document Erdogan recently suggested the prime minister of Iraq should read to understand his country’s interest in Mosul. Signed in 1920, after the Ottoman Empire’s defeat in World War I, the National Pact identified those parts of the empire that the government was prepared to fight for. Specifically, it claimed those territories that were still held by the Ottoman army in October 1918 when Constantinople signed an armistice with the allied powers. On Turkey’s southern border, this line ran from north of Aleppo in what is now Syria to Kirkuk in what is now Iraq.

When the allies made it clear they planned to leave the empire with a lot less than it held in 1918, it led to renewed fighting in which troops under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk defeated European forces to establish Turkey as it exists today. For the better part of the past century, Turkey’s official history lauded Ataturk for essentially realizing the borders envisioned by the National Pact (minus Mosul, of course), as recognized with the Treaty of Lausanne. It was an exaggerated claim, given the parts of the pact that were left out, but also an eminently practical one, intended to prevent a new and precarious Turkish republic from losing what it had achieved in pursuit of unrealistic territorial ambitions. Indeed, while countries like Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, and Hungary brought disaster on themselves by trying to forcibly rewrite their postwar borders, Turkey — under Ataturk and his successor — wisely resisted this urge.

Erdogan, by contrast, has given voice to an alternative narrative in which Ataturk’s willingness in the Treaty of Lausanne to abandon territories such as Mosul and the now-Greek islands in the Aegean was not an act of eminent pragmatism but rather a betrayal. The suggestion, against all evidence, is that better statesmen, or perhaps a more patriotic one, could have gotten more.

Among other things, Erdogan’s reinterpretation of history shows the ironies behind the widespread talk in the United States of his supposed “neo-Ottomanism.” A decade ago, Erdogan’s enthusiasm for all things Ottoman appeared to be part of an effective strategy for improving relations with the Muslim Middle East, a policy that some U.S. critics saw as a challenge to their country’s role in the region. But refashioning the National Pact as a justification for irredentism rather than a rebuke of it has not been popular among Turkey’s neighbors. Criticism of Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman foreign policy is now as likely to come from the Arab world as anywhere else.

Criticism of Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman foreign policy is now as likely to come from the Arab world as anywhere else. Erdogan’s use of the National Pact also demonstrates how successfully Turkey’s Islamists have reappropriated, rather than rejected, elements of the country’s secular nationalist historical narrative. Government rhetoric has been quick to invoke the heroism of Turkey’s war of independence in describing the popular resistance to the country’s July 15 coup attempt. And alongside the Ottomans, Erdogan routinely references the Seljuks, a Turkic group that preceded the Ottomans in the Middle East by several centuries, and even found a place for more obscure pre-Islamic Turkic peoples like the Gokturks, Avars, and Karakhanids that first gained fame in Ataturk’s 1930s propaganda.

Similarly, in Syria and Iraq, Erdogan is aiming to achieve a long-standing national goal, the defeat of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), by building on the traditional nationalist tools of Turkish foreign policy — namely, the leveraging of Turkish minorities in neighboring countries. The Sultan Murad Brigade, comprising predominantly ethnic Turkmens, has been one of Ankara’s military assets inside Syria against both Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the PKK. Meanwhile, the Turkmen population living around Mosul and its surrounding area has been a concern and an asset for Ankara in Iraq. Turkish special forces have worked with the Iraqi Turkmen Front since at least 2003 in order to expand Turkish influence and counter the PKK in northern Iraq.

Over the past century, the Turkish minorities in northern Greece and Cyprus have played a similar role. That is, their well-being has been a subject of genuine concern for Turkish nationalists but also a potential point of leverage with Athens to be used as needed. (Greece, of course, has behaved similarly with regard to the Greek minority in Turkey. Not surprisingly, both populations have often suffered reciprocally as a result.) In the case of Cyprus, for example, Turkey’s 1974 invasion was as much about defending its strategic position as it was about protecting the island’s Turkish community. Following his statements about Lausanne, Erdogan further upset Greece by stating, “Turkey cannot disregard its kinsmen in Western Thrace, Cyprus, Crimea, and anywhere else.” Yet Athens might take comfort from the case of the Crimean Tatars, which reveals the extent to which geopolitics can lead Turkey to do just this: Although Ankara raised concerns over the status of the Crimean Tatars after Russia seized the peninsula, it seems to have subsequently concluded that improved relations with Moscow take precedence over ethnic affinities.

But Erdogan has also emphasized a new element to Turkey’s communitarian foreign-policy agenda: Sunni sectarianism. In speaking about Mosul, he recently declared that Turkey would 
not betray its “Turkmen brothers” or its “Sunni Arab brothers.” Like secular Turkish nationalism, this strain of Sunni sectarianism has an undeniable domestic appeal, and Erdogan has shown it can also be invoked selectively in keeping with Turkey’s foreign-policy needs. Erdogan’s new sectarianism is evident in Mosul, where Turkey has warned of the risks to Sunnis should Shiite militias take control of the city. But the policy’s influence is clearest in Syria, where Turkey has been supporting Sunni rebels aiming to topple the Assad regime (including those now struggling to hold the city of Aleppo). In both Iraq and Syria, however, Turkey’s sectarianism has not been allowed to trump pragmatism. Ankara has been keen to maintain a mutually beneficial economic relationship with Iran despite backing opposite sides in Syria and in the past year has also expressed its willingness to make peace with Assad if circumstances require it.

More broadly, Turkey’s current interventionism in Syria and Iraq fits within an established pattern.  Turkey’s current interventionism in Syria and Iraq fits within an established pattern.   Not only do countries regularly find themselves sucked into civil wars on their doorstep, but the points at which Turkey has proved susceptible to irredentism in the past have all come at moments of change and uncertainty similar to what the Middle East is experiencing today. In 1939, Ankara annexed the province of Hatay, then under French control, by taking advantage of the crisis in Europe on the eve of World War II. Then, after that war, Syria’s newfound independence prompted some in the Turkish media to cast a glance at Aleppo, and the transfer of the Dodecanese Islands from Italy to Greece also piqued some interest in acquiring them for Turkey. Similarly, Ankara paid little attention to Cyprus when it was firmly under British control, but when talk of the island’s independence began, Turkey started to show its concern. Subsequently, it was only when it appeared Greece might annex the island that Turkey invaded to prevent this change in the status quo. In this light, Turkey’s recent rhetoric is perhaps less surprising following several years in which events and commentators have repeatedly suggested that the entire political order of the modern Middle East is crumbling.

More specifically, though, Turkish policy in the Middle East is driven by an urgent concern stemming from its conflict with the PKK, which has been exacerbated by the group’s gains in northern Syria. The PKK has long shaped Turkey’s relations with its southeastern neighbors. Most notably, Turkey nearly invaded Syria in 1998 in an ultimately successful effort to force Damascus to stop sheltering the group’s leader. Similarly, Turkey has kept military forces in the area of Mosul for the better part of two decades, in order to conduct operations against the PKK. Ankara has always portrayed this intervention, with little controversy in Turkey, as a matter of national security and self-defense. Today, self-defense remains Turkey’s main justification for its activities in Iraq, with Erdogan repeatedly 
emphasizing that the presence of Turkish forces there “acts as insurance against terrorist attacks targeting Turkey.” As long as the PKK maintains an open presence in Iraq, this is also the most compelling justification, domestically and internationally, for military involvement beyond its borders.

Indeed, to all the specific ethnic, sectarian, and historical rationales he has offered for Turkey’s interest in Mosul, Erdogan has been quick to attach one additional argument: The United States and Russia continue to play an outsized role in the region despite lacking any of these connections to it. Erdogan noted that some countries were telling Turkey, which shares a 220-mile border with Iraq, to stay out. Yet, despite not having history in the region or connection to it, these same countries were “coming and going.” “Did Saddam [Hussein] tell the United States to come to Iraq 14 years ago?” he added.
Behind the history, in other words, Ankara is all too aware of the fact that the power to do so remains the only rationale for foreign intervention that matters. In this regard, the legitimacy of Turkey’s plans for Mosul remains to be seen.

RE: TURKEY VISION 2053 - globalvision2000administrator - 12-21-2022










RE: TURKEY VISION 2053 - globalvision2000administrator - 12-21-2022


RE: TURKEY VISION 2053 - globalvision2000administrator - 12-21-2022


Turkey and the US have several shared interests, but the fact is that Turkey does not see itself as a 'junior partner' in the relationship anymore - and that means that when the US pushes, Turkey won't bend.  The United States and Turkey can’t stop squabbling over minor issues – and their enemies are profiting accordingly.  Iran is building an arc of influence to the Mediterranean Sea and has recently threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz. Bashar al Assad is mopping up the last pockets of opposition resistance – the opposition Turkey and the US supported in the hopes of bringing Assad down. Russia is hoping Assad and the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK, will reach a power-sharing agreement that will preserve the current scenario on Turkey’s southern border.

And yet, despite all this, there is no indication of a joint strategy to curb Iran’s ambitions, to destroy the Islamic State (Daesh), to weaken Assad, to discredit Russia’s intervention, or to find some basis for compromise on northern Syria. Instead, the news of the week is that the US has imposed sanctions on a couple of Turkish ministers—ironically the justice minister sanctioned was not in charge at the time of the arrest—for detaining American pastor Andrew Brunson in December 2016, and that Turkey is preparing a retaliatory response. 
From a purely interest-based perspective, this should not be happening. But politics can outweigh interests sometimes, and that’s what’s happening here.  From Turkey’s point of view, Washington’s actions are inexplicable. Turkey has charged Brunson with spying for the PKK, which both the US and Turkey consider a terrorist organization, and with aiding and abetting the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO). The US has said the charges are unfounded and that Brunson was simply “spreading his Christian faith.” The government in Ankara understandably believes US opinion is hardly a good enough reason to overturn judicial process. 

For Turkey, sanctions are not a good-faith gesture of a partner that has respect for Turkish institutions. And comparing Turkey to Nicaragua, China, North Korea, Russia and Daesh—as US Vice President Mike Pence did in a speech on July 26—is downright insulting.  From the United States’ point of view, Turkey’s actions are equally baffling. First, Turkey wants the US to turn over Gulen for masterminding the failed military coup two years ago without providing enough quality evidence that Gulen is guilty. (Turkey of course has provided the US with large amounts of evidence – the problem is the US finds it unconvincing.) 
Now, the US is equally unconvinced that an American pastor who has lived in Turkey for decades without any issue, was plotting to bring down the government. For Washington, this goes beyond disapproval of internal political developments inside Turkey. Detaining a US citizen in this manner is as confusing to the US as Turkey’s purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia. Like Turkey, the US feels it has been disrespected.
Which brings us to the current impasse. US President Donald Trump cannot afford to look weak on this. Brunson’s detainment is a major political issue for evangelical Christians in the United States – an important source of Trump’s support. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, too, can ill afford to look weak on this issue. The US has already embarrassed Erdogan by refusing to hand over Gulen and Erdogan has also embarrassed the US by bringing the Jerusalem issue to the UN. 

President Erdogan, at least, is not about to turn over a man accused of espionage and terrorism to the US just because Washington says so. The Brunson affair is just the latest in a series of small diplomatic incidents between the two NATO allies. But these incidents are merely symptoms of the deterioration of bilateral relations. The underlying cause is the massive transformation that Turkey has undergone in the past decade. Turkey’s people have voted to overhaul the country’s governance structure. Turkish society is struggling to find a new balance between the new Turkey, and the old Turkey. And Turkey’s leaders are grappling with how best to use Turkey’s considerable economic and military power to pursue Turkish interests abroad. 

Any one of these transformations by themselves would be enough to strain Turkey’s foreign relations. But together, they have upended the US-Turkey relationship. Turkey’s government, not the Turkish military, is now the ultimate power in the state. Instead of military officials being the primary conduit for US-Turkish relations, politicians–who are accountable to their political bases of support have taken their place. The most important change, however, is that Turkey no longer wants to be a junior partner of the United States. The US and Turkey may share interests, but Turkey isn’t merely Washington’s regional lackey. 
Washington’s willingness to support the YPG against Daesh showed Turkey that the US doesn’t regard Turkish interests as highly as Ankara would like. Thirty years ago, when the Soviet Union was still strong and when Turkey’s economy was a shadow of what it is today, Ankara might have had no choice but to swallow its pride and simply do Washington’s bidding. But that was then and this is now, and Turkey doubts the US has its bests interests in mind. Everything else that is happening now goes back to that key breakpoint – when the US threw its weight behind the YPG.
At the broadest level, there is still a basis for the US-Turkish partnership to not only continue, but to improve. For that to happen, though, both sides have to compromise, and if the Brunson affair is any indication, those compromises may have become too politically costly for both presidents.

Turkish president says his country will not back down to the bullets, cannonballs and missiles of economic wars
  • Turkey's president has pledged to defy what he describes US attempts to weaken his country's economy, rallying supporters a day after Washington imposed even higher tariffs on Turkish metals - and sent the lira tumbling. The two NATO allies remain at loggerheads over multiple issues ranging from diverging interests in Syria to Ankara's expressed desire in purchasing Russia's S400 anti-missile system, as well as the lingering case of an Evangelical pastor who is on trial in Turkey on terrorism charges.
Amid the worsening relations, the Turkish lira has lost more than 30 percent of its value against the US dollar since the start of the year. On Friday, US President Donald Trump's decision to double steel and aluminum tariffs on Turkey sent the lira into another dive, falling as much as 18.5 per cent at one point. Speaking on Saturday in the northeastern Turkish province of Rize, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said the US would pay a price by challenging Turkey for the sake of "petty calculations", denouncing Washington for declaring "economic war on the entire world" and holding countries "for ransom through sanction threats".

He also described dollars, euros and gold as "the bullets, cannonballs and missiles of the economic war being waged against our country".  "Those who can't compete with us on the ground have brought online fictional currency plots that have nothing to do with the realities of our country, production and real economy," Erdogan added.  
"The country is neither crumbling nor being destroyed or bankrupt or in a crisis," adding that the way out of the "currency plot" was to boost production and minimise interest rates.  
Erdogan is a self-described "enemy of interest rates" and wants cheap credit from banks to fuel growth.

Investors however fear the economy is overheating and could be set for a hard landing, while concerns over the dispute with the US have also hit Turkish stocks. The lira's fall meanwhile has raised concerns in the European Union about the exposure of some the bloc's biggest banks to Turkey. "There is a currency crisis, kind of promoted by the geopolitical risks, and which is obviously used by the American foreign policy decision-makers," Selva Tor, a financial security analyst, told Al Jazeera.

Pastor's case
Ankara's delicate relations with the US soured further following the arrest of pastor Andrew Brunson in 2016 on charges of "committing crimes on behalf of terror groups without being a member" and espionage.  Brunson served as pastor of Izmir Resurrection Church, a small Protestant congregation, and has lived in Turkey for more than 20 years. He was detained by Turkish forces in the aftermath of a failed coup blamed by Ankara on Fethullah Gulen, a religious leader living in self-imposed exile in the United States. Gulen has denied any involvement. Trump has described Brunson's detention as a "total disgrace" and urged Erdogan to free him "immediately". The Christian right, an important component of Trump and Vice President Mike Pence's voting base, has been pressuring the administration on the Brunson case.

But in a New York Times opinion piece published on Saturday, Erdogan cautioned against pressuring his administration into meddling with the judicial process. "Attempting to force my government to intervene in the judicial process is not in line with our constitution or our shared democratic values."

Partnership in 'jeopardy'
He also said that his country's partnership with the US is in jeopardy, warning that Ankara may start looking for new allies. In Rize, Erdogan said Turkey had alternatives "from Iran, to Russia, to China and some European countries".  Meanwhile, Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif waded into the intensifying dispute, accusing the US of an "addiction to sanctions and bullying".

"The US has to rehabilitate its addiction to sanctions [and] bullying or the entire world will unite - beyond verbal condemnations - to force it to," he warned.  "We've stood with neighbours before and will again now."  Analysts believe that another factor in the growing disagreement between Turkey and the US is Ankara's unwillingness to join recent sanctions against Tehran in the wake of Washington's withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.  Turkey is a buyer of energy from Iran, as well as from Russia and Azerbaijan.


Turkish President Erdogan's statements follow US President Donald Trump's announcement that he had doubled steel and aluminium tariffs on Turkey, noting that relations between the NATO allies were "not very good".  Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Turks should not be alarmed by exchange rate movements. (August 10, 2018) (Reuters)

Unilateral steps taken by the US only harm its interests and security, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on Friday in an article he wrote for The New York Times. “At a time when evil continues to lurk around the world, unilateral actions against Turkey by the United States, our ally of decades, will only serve to undermine American interests and security,” Erdogan said in the article.

His remarks came after US President Donald Trump’s decision to raise tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminium. Erdogan urged Washington to give up the misguided notion that bilateral relations could be “asymmetrical” and realise that Turkey had alternatives “before it is too late”. 

“Failure to reverse this trend of unilateralism and disrespect will require us to start looking for new friends and allies,” he added.

Earlier on Friday, Trump ramped up his attack on Turkey by doubling US tariffs on Turkish aluminium and steel imports to 20 percent and 50 percent, respectively. 
Erdogan said the two countries have been strategic partners and NATO allies for six decades and reminded Washington that Turkey and the US “stood shoulder to shoulder against common challenges during the Cold War and its aftermath”. 
 “Over the years, Turkey rushed to America’s help whenever necessary,” he said, listing a few occasions the two countries acted together.

Erdogan added that Washington had always “failed to understand and respect the Turkish people’s concerns”.  

He said disagreements had occurred between the two countries in recent years and Turkey’ s efforts to reverse the “dangerous trend” were in vain.

“Unless the United States starts respecting Turkey’s sovereignty and proves that it understands the dangers that our nation faces, our partnership could be in jeopardy,” Erdogan said.

Damage relationship
In a tweet on Friday, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hami Aksoy said President Donald Trump's decision, which also violates the rules of World Trade Organization, "cannot be associated with seriousness expected from a state."  

"All the steps taken against Turkey will be given a befitting response as they have been given before," he vowed. 

Aksoy said sanctions would only damage the relationship which has withstood the trials of time.  
The US decision is another salvo in the growing dispute between it and Turkey.

Ahmed Bedier, the President of the United Voices for America, speaks to TRT World about Trump's moves.

Earlier this week, a Turkish delegation returned from Washington with no movement on the detention of American pastor Andrew Brunson, who is under house arrest in Turkey over terrorism charges.

TRT World's Lionel Donovan reports from Washington.

Brunson's charges include spying for the PKK – listed as a terrorist group by both the US and Turkey – and Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO).  Turkey and the US are currently experiencing rocky relations following Washington’s imposition of sanctions on Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu and Justice Minister Abdulhamit Gul for not releasing Brunson.

The two NATO allies have been at odds since the coup attempt, which Ankara accused US-based Fetullah Gulen and his FETO of masterminding.

After Turkish president urges people to support currency, US counterpart adds pressure with doubling of metals' tariffs.

Turkey became the fastest-growing country in the world last year, with an economic growth rate of 7.4 percent, according to the government [Presidential Press Service via AP

US President Donald Trump has announced a doubling of steel and aluminum tariffs on Turkey, piling economic pressure on the NATO ally after its currency went into a tail-spin.  Trump's announcement on Friday came hours after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan lashed out against a shadowy international "interest rate lobby" which, he suggested, was "campaigning" to harm Turkey's economy, after the lira fell more than 14 percent overnight.

The Turkish currency extended its losses following Trump's statement, dropping as much as 20 percent amid growing worries about worsening relations with the US. Washington has been pushing Ankara to release an American pastor, who is being held on terrorism charges.

Earlier this week, Erdogan ordered the asset freeze of two US officials in retaliation for sanctions imposed on Turkey's justice and interior ministers over the detention of an Evangelical Christian pastor Andrew Brunson.

Donald J. Trump

I have just authorized a doubling of Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum with respect to Turkey as their currency, the Turkish Lira, slides rapidly downward against our very strong Dollar! Aluminum will now be 20% and Steel 50%. Our relations with Turkey are not good at this time!

Since the start of the year, the lira has more than 30 percent of its value against the US dollar, with the currency tumbling even faster after the country's June presidential election which saw Erdogan re-elected with expanded power. On Friday, Erdogan renewed a call for Turks to exchange gold and dollars into liras, framing the country's currency crisis as a "national battle" against economic enemies.  

"The dollar cannot block our path," Erdogan said during a speech in the Black Sea city of Rize.  
"However, I say it once again from here. If there is anyone who has dollars or gold under their pillows, they should go exchange it for liras at our banks," he told the crowd. Erdogan, a self-described "enemy of interest rates", wants cheap credit from banks to fuel growth, but investors fear the economy is overheating and could be set for a hard landing. But in a defiant tone, the president brushed aside concerns, telling the roaring supporters not to worry. 

"There are several campaigns being carried out [against Turkey]. Do not heed them," Erdogan said. "If they have their dollars, we have our people, our God. Know this: We are better than yesterday, we will be even better tomorrow. Have no doubts about it," he added.

Despite the turmoil, Turkey became the fastest-growing country in the world last year, with an economic growth rate of 7.4 percent, according to the government
Following Trump's announcement on Twitter that he would double duties on Turkish aluminium and steel, to 20 percent and 50 percent respectively, Ankara responded by saying the tariffs were against the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
"Turkey expects other member countries to abide by international rules," the Turkish trade ministry said in a statement, adding that it would support steel and aluminum exporters in all international platforms. It also said the US remained an important trade partner.

A spokesman for Turkey's foreign ministry said it would retaliate against the tariffs as it has done so far. Sanctions and pressure would only serve to harm ties between the two NATO allies, Hami Aksoy also said in a statement. Ankara wanted issues to be solved through diplomacy, dialogue and good intentions, Aksoy said.

Political reasons?
Al Jazeera's Sinem Koseoglu, reporting from Turkey's largest city of Istanbul, said that "the growing but fragile" Turkish economy "has been struggling for a few years over a combination of several financial and political factors".  Analysts said that the lira was not protected against any currency speculation, especially after a failed coup in 2016, while the dispute with the US over a variety of issues has complicated things further.  "There is a currency crisis, kind of promoted by the geopolitical risks, and which is obviously used by the American foreign policy decision-makers," Selva Tor, a financial security analyst, told Al Jazeera.  Apart from the disagreement over Brunson's detention, Koseoglu said another factor is Ankara's unwillingness to join recent US sanctions against Tehran in the wake of Washington's withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.  Turkey is a purchaser of energy from Iran, along with Russia and Azerbaijan.

Meanwhile, the crisis was also felt abroad, with investors selling shares in European banks amid concerns about their Turkey exposure.  Jane Foley, head of Rabobank's foreign exchange strategy, said the Turkish government has a huge task ahead to earn back investors' trust.  She described the situation as "a crisis of credibility" amid some investor concerns over the Central Bank's perceived lack of independence  "The speculation in the market is that if that Central Bank is to retake credibility, it might need to hike interest rates next month by 5 or 10 percent ... which seems very unlikely given that Erdogan is very much against high-interest rates in Turkey," she told Al Jazeera.  






RE: TURKEY VISION 2053 - globalvision2000administrator - 12-21-2022


Prof Michel Chossudovsky

A major and far-reaching shift in military alliances is unfolding.  
While Turkey is still “officially” a member of NATO, president Recep Tayyip Erdo?an has been developing “friendly relations” with two of America’s staunchest enemies, namely Iran and Russia. . 

US-Turkey military cooperation (including US air force bases in Turkey) dates back to the Cold War. Today Turkey is sleeping with the enemy. And Trump has (“rhetorically”) declared war on Turkey.  We are ready for war,  says President Erdogan.

“The secret to successful states is their readiness for war. We are ready with everything we have,” (Erdogan’s statement on August 12, meeting with ambassadors in Ankara) 

Erdogan also accuses the US of waging a “financial warfare” against Turkey.

Turkish banks are under attack. In turn, a banking crisis is unfolding in the European Union largely hitting EU banks which hold substantial portions of Turkey’s debt.

According to Turkey’s president:

“It is everyone’s observation that the developments in foreign currency exchange have no financial basis and they are an attack on our country… On the one hand you are a strategic ally and the other you shoot (the country) in the foot. Is something like this acceptable?” (Ahvalnews)

While the media has its eyes riveted on the collapse of the Turkish Lira (which so far in 2018 has lost approximately 40 percent of its value in relation to the US dollar), NATO is in a state of disarray, with one of its member states “at war” with another member state, namely the United States of America.

Turkey by a long shot has the largest conventional forces (after the US) within NATO outpacing France, Britain and Germany, (not to mention its tactical B61 nuclear weapons capabilities).


Broadly speaking, the US-Turkey rift and its implications for the Atlantic Alliance are either ignored or trivialized by the media. The entire structure of military alliances is defunct. NATO is in a shambles. Turkey is to acquire Russia’s state of the art S-400 air defense system. Why? Does this mean that Turkey which is a NATO member state will withdraw from the integrated US-NATO-Israel air defense system? Such a decision is tantamount to NATO Exit. 

 “On  July 26, the US Congress decided to ban the shipment of F-35 aircraft to Turkey unless  Ankara refused to purchase S-400 anti-aircraft systems from Russia.” (Pravda)

The US-Turkey-Israel “Triple Alliance” is Also Defunct

In 1993, Israel and Turkey signed a Memorandum of Understanding leading to the creation of (Israeli-Turkish) “joint committees” to handle so-called regional threats. Under the terms of the Memorandum, Turkey and Israel agreed “to cooperate in gathering intelligence on Syria, Iran, and Iraq and to meet regularly to share assessments pertaining to terrorism and these countries’ military capabilities.”

Image on the right: Sharon and Erdogan in 2004

The triple alliance was also coupled with a 2005 NATO-Israeli military cooperation agreement which included “many areas of common interest, such as the fight against terrorism and joint military exercises.”  These military cooperation ties with NATO were viewed by the Israeli military as a means to “enhance Israel’s deterrence capability regarding potential enemies threatening it, mainly Iran and Syria.”

The “triple alliance” linking the US, Israel and Turkey was coordinated by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was an integrated and coordinated military command structure pertaining to the broader Middle East. It was based on close bilateral US military ties respectively with Israel and Turkey, coupled with a strong bilateral military relationship between Tel Aviv and Ankara. In this regard, Israel and Turkey have been close partners with the US in planned aerial attacks on Iran since 2005. (See Michel Chossudovsky, May 2005)

Needless to say, that triple alliance is defunct. With Turkey siding with Iran and Russia, it would be “suicide” for US-Israel to even consider waging aerial attacks on Iran. Moreover, the NATO-Israel 2005 military cooperation agreement which relied heavily on the role of Turkey is dysfunctional. What this means is that US-Israeli threats directed against Iran are no longer supported by Turkey which has entered into an alliance of convenience with Iran.

The broader Realignment of Military alliances

The shift in military alliances is not limited to Turkey. Following the rift between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is in disarray with Qatar siding with Iran and Turkey against Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Qatar is of utmost strategic significance because it shares with Iran the world’s largest maritime gas fields in the Persian Gulf. (see map below)

The Al-Udeid military base near Doha is America’s largest military base in the Middle East. In turn, Turkey has now established its own military facility in Qatar.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

A profound shift in geopolitical alliances is also occurring in South Asia with the instatement in 2017 of both India and Pakistan as full members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).  Inevitably, this historic shift constitutes a blow against Washington, which has defense and trade agreements with both Pakistan and India. “While India remains firmly aligned with Washington, America’s political stranglehold on Pakistan (through military and intelligence agreements) has been weakened as a result of Pakistan’s trade and investment deals with China.”  (Michel Chossudovsky, August 1, 2017)

In other words, this enlargement of the SCO weakens America’s hegemonic ambitions in both South Asia and the broader Eurasian region. It has a bearing on energy pipeline routes, transport corridors, borders and mutual security and maritime rights.Pakistan is the gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, where US influence has been weakened to the benefit of China, Iran and Turkey. China is involved in major investments in mining, not to mention the development of transport routes which seek the integration of Afghanistan into Western China.

Where does Turkey fit in? Turkey is increasingly part of the Eurasian project dominated by China and Russia. In 2017-18, Erdogan had several meetings with both president Xi-Jingping and Vladimir Putin. Erdogan has been contemplating becoming a member of the SCO since 2016 but sofar nothing concrete has emerged.

The Antiwar Movement: NATO Exit People’s Movement

Of crucial significance, the crisis within NATO constitutes a historic opportunity to develop a NATO Exit people’s movement across Europe and North America, a people’s movement pressuring governments to withdraw from the Atlantic Alliance, a movement to eventually dismantle and abolish the military and political apparatus of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

RE: TURKEY VISION 2053 - globalvision2000administrator - 12-21-2022




TSK Armoni Mizikasi

TSK Armoni Mizikasi: Sakarya Marsi
Turkish Military March




RE: TURKEY VISION 2053 - globalvision2000administrator - 12-21-2022





The US Senate's move to prohibit Turkey from acquiring F-35 jets can be a major setback to NATO, as other world powers race to catch up.  On August 13, US President Donald Trump signed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) into law, which includes legislation calling for the delay in 100 ordered F-35 fighter jets to Turkey.  The move was seen as the latest punitive measure against Turkey and yet another arm-twisting tactic to free American Pastor Andrew Brunson, who's been put under house arrest while awaiting trial on espionage and terrorism-related charges in Izmir province.

Besides enforcing a delay on the F-35 deal, Washington doubled tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminium exports to the US, causing economic strain in several markets.  President Trump's erratic foreign policy moves have not only antagonised Ankara but also exposed NATO to a security threat.  A senior NATO military official, speaking to TRT World on condition of anonymity, warned of undesirable consequences if Turkey was removed from the F-35 program. The official said Turkey's removal would “violate the joint-development partnership agreement” and “undermine the United States’ legitimacy in NATO.” He further warned that “a delay would be a strategic risk and setback to NATO in the global race to deploy the fifth-generation stealth fighters, particularly as other world powers are rushing to deploy theirs.”

In a letter obtained by Bloomberg, US Defense Secretary James Mattis also urged caution,  

lawmakers against removing Turkey from the program, as it could cause “supply chain disruption” resulting in increased costs and delays for the $100 million fighter jet, which has already seen budget overruns and delays. Mattis told the Senate Armed Services Committee that this would result in “an aircraft production break,” delaying delivery and taking significant time to resource parts.

Mike Friedman, a Lockheed Martin spokesperson, confirmed Turkey’s essential position in the F-35 supply chain, citing 8-10 Turkish companies engaged in the production of parts for the F-35, some of which are important components.   Lara Seligman, Aviation Week's Pentagon correspondent, notes “the main European hub for the F-35’s engine repair and overhaul is in Eskisehir, in northwestern Turkey.” Moreover, publicly available data from Lockheed Martin states that as of August 13, 2018, over 310 F-35s from a planned 3,000 are already flying from 15 bases around the world.

In a comment to the Defence Post, Aaron Stein, Atlantic Council defence analyst, explains that Turkey is a single-source producer of key F-35 engine components and a secondary producer of its fuselage. Turkey is home to the second largest land-based army in NATO after the US. With a hefty $100 million price-tag on the planes, the fighter jet’s production was only possible through shared funding and development by over 35 nations, including Turkey. The program is expected to cost $406.5 billion for acquisition and manufacturing, and an additional $1.1 trillion for operations and maintenance throughout its lifetime.

The Trump Administration is using everything in their means to browbeat Turkey. The NDAA 
legislation also calls on US executives of the World Bank, International Finance Corporation, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to stand in the way of loans to Turkey in the coming future.  Experts argue that the political showdown has gradually centred around the US evangelical voter base, with increasing attention given to Pastor Brunson following his meteoric rise to the top of the US foreign policy agenda a year and a half after he was charged with espionage and terrorism.  “[The US] Congress and the administration are very sensitive towards their evangelical electoral base,” Brookings analyst Kemal Kirisci says. 

This is consistent with key appointments of evangelicals by President Trump, notably US Vice President Mike Pence, former CIA director and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, as well as Sam Brownback, the US ambassador for international religious freedom.  "In every church in the country, people know the name Andrew Brunson," says Johnnie Moore, a member of the Evangelical Advisory Council who advises Mr Trump. "The Brunson case is a call for evangelicals within the Republican base because you have a Christian pastor in a Muslim-majority country," says Amanda Sloat, senior fellow of the Brookings Institution. "It seems that's something Pence has been promoting right from the start."

The evangelical voter base has been crucial to Republican victories in the past, with analysts suggesting that Trump and Pence are catering to the demographic ahead of the 2018 midterm primary elections, in order to ensure continued Republican control of Congress.  In this light, Senators Thom Tillis and Jeanne Shaheen did not shy away from co-sponsoring the F-35 delay, while the National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA) annual budget was being finalised last May. The focus on Pastor Brunson’s release presents a significant bipartisan appeal to lawmakers, given that 81 percent of white evangelicals voted for Republican nominee Trump, according to an exit poll. A poll conducted by PRRI suggests nearly 70 percent of evangelicals support Donald Trump for the 2020 elections.

The official explanation for the F-35 delay is linked to the Turkish bid to purchase the Russian S-400 missile system, arguing that it would hamper military coordination between Turkey and its NATO allies. The argument contradicts NATO ally Greece’s acquisition of the Russian S-300 missile system, which is universally recognised as a sovereign decision regarding national defence.  Dylan White, NATO press officer, responded to TRT World on the NATO position towards the S-400 sale. He reaffirmed NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg's position that member states have the sovereign right to make decisions regarding their military purchases and clarified that Turkey, a key NATO ally, would not be ostracised for seeking solutions for its national defence.

Turkish missile defence acquisitions have historically been a contentious issue, as the nation sought to bolster its domestic defence. In 2013, Turkey 
launched a tender aiming to purchase defence systems. A Chinese company, CPMIEC, offered the most affordable price, but the US pressured Turkey into dropping the deal based on sanctions on alleged missile sales to Iran. The blocked sale is seen as one of the many let-downs by allies, another one being previous withdrawals of deployed missile systems. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reaffirmed this in a statement last Friday: "Do you know what they were doing when [southern Turkish provinces] Kilis, Gaziantep, Reyhanli and Kirikhan were being attacked by Syria with 127 rocket, artillery or mortar attacks, and seven citizens lost their lives, and 125 others were injured? They were pulling back air defence systems previously deployed in our country."

To further justify the delay in the F-35 delivery, the US has also questioned Turkey’s loyalty towards NATO. The US Congress has warned that Turkey's access to the Russian-made S-400 missile system could jeopardise the NATO Integrated Air Defense System, by potentially leaking classified information regarding the F-35 stealth fighter aircraft to Russia. The Turkish government has rejected these claims, stating that the F-35 and NATO integrated defence network would run on a separate network from the Russian S-400.

Hassan Imran, an independent analyst speaking to TRT World, notes that the US stance risks alienating newer NATO partners such as the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia, who all employ a range of Russian weapon systems without facing challenges of interoperability or warnings of operational security. He says, “the current political climate only risks estranging newer NATO members and further undermining the alliance.”   “Turkey has long controlled the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s expansion and access into the Mediterranean. This is now a more significant concern with Syria’s concession of the Mediterranean naval base of Tartus to Russia.”     The anti-Daesh operations, he concludes, were only possible with NATO and US airpower operating out of Turkey’s Incirlik Airbase, a station for US nuclear weapons and thousands of US military personnel.


"We are proposing to trade in our own currencies rather than the US dollar," Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek, where he is attending a regional summit. International trade's dependency on the US dollar should be decreased as it has become an obstacle for Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on Monday.  Erdogan made the remarks in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek, where he is attending the sixth summit of the Turkic Council.    "We are proposing to trade in our own currencies rather than US dollar," Turkey's president said.  

The Turkish leader said separately that recent events proved Turkey and its friends should not delay their fight against the Fetullah Terrorist Organisation (FETO). The summit is being hosted by Kyrgyzstan's President Sooronbay Jeenbekov.  In attendance are the Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkey and Uzbekistan, with Hungary taking part as an observer and represented by its prime minister.

RE: TURKEY VISION 2053 - globalvision2000administrator - 12-21-2022


With close bonds forged from birth, Turkey and Pakistan stand to gain everything from building enduring strategic ties. The question is not why, but when. Pakistan’s relationship with the modern Republic of Turkey goes back well before its inception. The two countries have shared a close bond for seven decades since Pakistan’s independence from British India. 

Yet for all the history and cordial ties between the two Republics, there has never been a truly strategic partnership paying significant dividends either bilaterally or internationally. As both countries now face similar pressures from the United States, and encounter the ever changing geopolitics of the Middle East and West Asia – opportunities have arisen for the two countries to capitalise on converting a historic relationship into a meaningful partnership.  Indeed, the two countries have been looking at a more substantial pivot from which to build deep economic, security and regional cooperation. As the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu arrived in Islamabad on an official two day visit to meet the new government, the question is more pressing now than ever, can their fraternal ties truly become strategic?

A close bond forged at birth 
Professor Naeem Qureshi, Quaid e Azam University, is the world’s leading figure on historical ties between the Muslims of the Indian Subcontinent and the Ottoman Empire. In his book, Ottoman Turkey, Ataturk and South Asia, he details the support given by leading members of the Indian Muslim community to assist the Turkish War of Independence when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk led the Ottoman Army that would go on to defeat the Allied powers, carving out what would eventually become the Modern Republic of Turkey. 

The official Ataturk research center and Turkish government also quoteProfessor Qureshi’s work, with regards to Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Muhammad Iqbal’s support to the Turkish nationalist cause. Jinnah and Iqbal of course went on to become two leading figures that helped establish Pakistan itself. The close bond between the two nations runs much deeper. Jinnah has a major road named after him in Ankara, just as Ataturk has one named after him in Islamabad. 

For decades, Turkish children have sung Pakistan national songs and celebratedPakistan’s national days.  Earlier this year, the Pakistan President, Mamnoon Hussain, called Turkey, ‘Pakistan’s best friend’ while speaking at an eventhonouring 71 years of friendship. What does this actually mean however, beyond the rhetoric, hugs and smiles?

A Turkish path for Pakistan 
Pakistan’s ties with Turkey have not been impacted by the civil-military crisis between Rawalpindi and Islamabad, and whoever has been in power in Pakistan, with Ankara always remaining a close friend. Much has been written about the nations’ similarities in history in particular civil-military relations within a democratic order and the perceived best interests of the nation. On the other hand, there has always been a strong view that the United States has been complicit in coups affecting both countries.  With the Turkish and Pakistani Generals having enjoyed in the past, warm ties with American leaders throughout the cold war and since 9/11, in the case of former President Musharraf.  Ironically, Musharraf who himself grew up in Turkey and speaks fluent Turkish, has always spoken of his admiration of Ataturk, and his desire to follow a Turkish model in building Pakistan into a modern democracy. 

As the current Pakistan Army Chief of Staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa speaks of a new era of democracy in Pakistan, Turkey is best poised to become a positive influence in soothing civil-military relations that have been entrenched for decades in Pakistan.  Former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif has also spoken often of his admiration of the Turkish model of government and looked up to the current Turkish leadership as an example for Pakistan to follow. In return, President Erdogan has consistently repeated that Turkey wishes to see a strong Pakistan. Pakistani leaders, whether democratic or military, have been consistent in voicing their wish for this Turkish model.

Defence and Economic Ties to be a Key Focus
The Pakistani and Turkish militaries are the only part of the ongoing bilateral relationship that has had a truly strategic partnership, away from the pictures and handshakes. Earlier this year, Pakistan and Turkey signed their biggest defence deal in history, after Turkey agreed to sell domestically-produced attack helicopters to Islamabad in what was also Ankara’s biggest export deal yet and a significant boost for its defence industry. 

Islamabad on the other hand, benefits from access to reliable, state-of-the-art military technology at affordable prices. Both countries can capitalise significantly on this domain. Just as Turkey is facing opposition in the delivery of its F-35’s despite being a staunch NATO member and contributing to the development of the aircraft – Pakistan has also faced an uphill struggle in receiving F-16s and other military equipment it paid for despite being a major non-member NATO ally. 

Both countries have been accused of terrorism by the United States and have been asked ‘to do more’, in the 'War on Terror'. Both countries have made significant sacrifices on the front line of the wars in Syria and Afghanistan respectively fighting terrorism, and looked after millions of refugees.  In the aftermath of the PKK and Daesh terrorist attacks, Pakistan was one of the first countries to offer support to Turkey. Turkey in return, also asked Pakistan’s assistance in the fight against terror after Pakistan’s success in Zarb e Azbmilitary operations in its north west. Pakistan also purchased naval equipment from Turkey, with the two countries also buying each other’s aircraft trainers for their respective air forces.

Moreover, the extensive military exercises between the two countries are now a landmark of their rooted ties, particularly with their focus on combined arms cooperation between their Air Forces and Special Forces.   On his current trip, the Turkish Foreign minister has honed in on the importance of defence and economic ties in his meetings with his Prime Minister Imran Khan and the Army Chief of Staff.

Can potential find reality?
It can be argued that apart from close military ties and defence deals, not much has happened elsewhere despite lofty statements and meetings over the last few decades.  Turkey and Pakistan have yet to sign a free-trade agreement, with a number of high-profile controversies taking place on major state-level commercial deals. So far, bilateral trade deals and their volumes have been the subject of much talk rather than an actual increase in commerce between the two countries. Apart from successfully working closely together on the Afghanistan conflict, the two countries have never forged a strategic regional partnership since the collapse of the cold war era Baghdad Pact.

President Erdogan, in congratulating Imran Khan, has called for a new era in relations and ties between the two countries. With the two countries supporting each other on every diplomatic, security and economic crisis, and particularly over the last three years, one senses the time is near for an enduring strategic partnership to the benefit of their nations and regions.